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We define and characterise two kinds of facts that play a role in quantum theory: stable and relative.
We describe how stable facts emerge in a world of relative facts and then discuss the respective roles
they play in connecting the theory and the world. The distinction between relative and stable facts
resolves the difficulties pointed out by the no-go theorems of Frauchiger and Renner, Brukner, and
Bong et. al.. Basing the ontology of the theory on relative facts clarifies the role of decoherence
in bringing about the classical world and solves the apparent incompatibility between the ‘linear
evolution’ and ‘projection’ postulates.
I. FACTS IN QUANTUM THEORY
The common textbook presentation of quantum theory
assumes the existence of a classical world. A measure-
ment involves an interaction between the classical world
and a quantum system. The measurement produces a
definite result, for instance a dot on a screen. The result
is a fact by itself, but also establishes a fact about a quan-
tum system. For instance, a certain measurement result-
ing in a definite record establishes that at some time the
z-component of the spin of an electron is Lz =
~
2 . This
is a fact.
Quantum probabilities are probabilities for facts, given
other facts. The facts are therefore entries of which the
probability amplitudes are function. In particular, facts
are used as conditionals for computing probabilities of
other facts. For instance, if the spin of the electron men-
tioned above is then immediately measured in a direction
at an angle θ from the z-axis, the probability to find the
value Lθ =
~
2 (a fact), given the fact that Lz =
~
2 , is
P
(
Lθ=
~
2 |Lz= ~2
)
= cos2(θ/2). Hence, facts are what
quantum mechanics is about.
Facts ascertained in a conventional measurement are
stable in the following sense. If we know that one of N
mutually exclusive facts ai (i = 1 . . . N) has happened,
the probability P (b) for a fact b to happen is given by
P (b) =
∑
i
P (b|ai)P (ai), (1)
where P (ai) is the probability that ai has happened and
P (b|ai) is the probability for b given ai. We take equation
(1) as a characterisation of stable facts.
This textbook presentation of quantum mechanics is
incomplete because it assumes the existence of a classi-
cal world. An exactly classical world might exist because
current quantum theory has limited validity—for in-
stance is violated by physical collapse mechanisms [1, 2],
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or cannot be extended to systems with an infinite num-
ber of degrees of freedom [3], or else. But the universal
success of the theory and all current empirical evidence
strongly suggest that real physical objects are ‘classical’,
meaning they do not display quantum properties, only
approximatively. There are no exactly classical objects,
strictly speaking, as everything we interact with is made
of atoms and photons, which obey quantum theory.
In formulating the fundamental theory of nature, the
use of effective concepts valid only within an approxi-
mation is unconvincing. Therefore the attempts to in-
terpret quantum theory as a universal theory, such as
Many Worlds, Hidden Variables, and others do not rely
on postulating classical objects. A possibility to interpret
quantum theory as a universal theory neither postulating
classical objects, nor postulating unobservable worlds,
unobservable variables, or unobserved physics, is Rela-
tional Quantum Mechanics (RQM) [4, 5]. RQM bases
the interpretation of the theory on a larger ensemble of
facts, of which stable facts are only a subset. These are
called relative facts.
A. Relative facts
Relative facts are defined to happen whenever a phys-
ical system interacts with another physical system. Con-
sider two systems S and F . If an interaction affects F
in a manner that depends on the value of a certain vari-
able1 LS of S, then the value of LS is a fact relative to
F . This is true by definition irrespectively of whether F
is a classical system or not. That is, whenever the two
systems interact, the value of the variable LS becomes a
fact relative to F .
The interaction with F is the context in which LS takes
a specific value; we call the system F , in this role, a
1 We use ‘variable’ to denote any quantity that in the classical the-
ory is a function on phase pace. We prefer to avoid the expression
‘observable’, which is loaded with irrelevant extra baggage: the
ideas of observation and a complex observer.
2‘context’.2 The interaction with the context determines
the fact that a certain variable, LS , has a certain value.
Stable facts are only a subset of relative facts, as
there are many relative facts that are not stable facts.
Quantum theory provides probabilities that relate rela-
tive facts, but these satisfy (1) only if b and the ai are
facts relative to the same system. That is, if we label
facts with the system they refer to, writing a(F) for a fact
relative to the system F , it is always true that
P (b(F)) =
∑
i
P (b(F)|a(F)i )P (a(F)i ), (2)
while it is in general false that
P (b(W)) =
∑
i
P (b(W)|a(F)i )P (a(F)i ) (3)
ifW 6= F . When (3) holds, we say that the facts a(F)i are
stable with respect to W.
The failure of (3) is easily understood in terms of the
standard language of quantum theory. If F is sufficiently
isolated it may be possible to maintain the quantum co-
herence of the coupled system S−F formed by S and F
together. The interaction entangles the two systems and
interference effects between different values of the vari-
able LS can later be detected in the measurements by
an observer W. The probabilities for facts of the S−F
system relative to W, indeed, can be computed from an
entangled state of the form
c1|a1〉 ⊗ |Fa1〉+ c2|a2〉 ⊗ |Fa2〉 (4)
where ai are values of LS and Fai are values of F ′s
‘pointer variable’ LF . Probabilities computed from this
state feature interference terms, and this violates (3) be-
cause what sums is amplitudes, not probabilities. The
value of LS , therefore, is not a stable fact.
Hence facts relative to a system F cannot in general be
taken as conditionals for computing probabilities of facts
relative to a different systemW. Equation (1) holds only
if b and ai are facts relative to the same system, but fails
in general if used for facts relative to different systems.
The notation S for ‘system’, F for ‘Friend’ and W
for ‘Wigner’ is meant to to evoke the famous Wigner’s
friend ideal experiment [8]; there is no assumption, how-
ever, about the system F being quantum or classical,
microscopic or macroscopic.
Relative facts play a central role in the Relational In-
terpretation of Quantum Mechanics (RQM) [4, 5]. We
shall discuss this role in detail later on. First, how-
ever, we ask the following questions: what exactly char-
acterises a stable fact, among the relative facts? What
gives rise to stable facts?
2 We use ‘context’ here in a sense similar to its use in [6]. The
difference is that we do not require the context to be classical.
See [7].
B. Decoherence
Since stability is a characteristic feature of the classi-
cal world (whose facts invariably satisfy (1)), answering
the questions above amounts to explaining in terms of
relative facts what it takes for a system to be classical.
Various characterisations of a classical or semiclassical
situation can be found in the literature: large quantum
numbers, semiclassical wave packets or coherent states,
macroscopic systems, large or infinite number of degrees
of freedom... All these features play a role in charac-
terising classical systems in specific situations. But the
key phenomenon that makes facts stable is decoherence
[9–11]: the suppression of quantum interference that hap-
pens when some information becomes inaccessible.
Consider two systems F and E (E for ‘Environment’),
and a variable LF of the system F . Let Fai be the
eigenvalues of LF . A generic state of the coupled system
F − E can be written in the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci |Fai〉 ⊗ |ψi〉 , (5)
where |ψi〉 are normalised states of E . Define
 = max
i,j
| 〈ψi|ψj〉 |2. (6)
Now, suppose that: (a)  is vanishing or very small and
(b) a systemW does not interact with E . Then the prob-
ability P (b) of any possible fact relative to W resulting
from an interaction between F and W can be computed
from the density matrix obtained tracing over E , that is
ρ = TrE |ψ〉〈ψ| =
∑
i
|ci|2 |Fai〉〈Fai|+O(). (7)
By posing P (Fa(E)i ) = |ci|2, we can then write
P (b(W)) =
∑
i
P (b(W)|Fa(E)i )P (Fa(E)i ) +O(). (8)
Thus, probabilities for facts b relative to W calculated
in terms of the possible values of LF satisfy (3) up to a
small deviation. Hence the fact LF = ai relative to E
is stable with respect to W to the extent to which one
ignores effects of order . In the limit → 0, the variable
LF of the system F is exactly stable with respect to W.
The extensive theoretical work on decoherence [12] has
shown that decoherence is practically unavoidable and
extremely effective as soon as large numbers of degrees
of freedom are involved. The variables of F that deco-
here, namely the variables for which  becomes small, are
determined by the actual physical interactions between
F and E , they are those that commute with the inter-
action Hamiltonian. The decoherence time, namely the
time needed for  to become so small that interference ef-
fects become undetectable by given observational meth-
ods, can be computed and is typically extremely short for
macroscopic variables of macroscopic objects. All this is
well understood.
3It is important for what follows to emphasise two sub-
tle aspects of decoherence. First, decoherence is not an
absolute phenomenon, but a relative one: it depends on
how the third systemW interacts with the combined sys-
tem F−E . Indeed, assumption (b) above is just as crucial
as assumption (a) in deriving (8). Another systemW ′ in-
teracting with F−E differently might be able to detect
interference effects.
Second, decoherence implies that an event regarding
two systems F and E is stable with respect to at third
system W. That is, the variable LF is stable relative
to W even if the latter has not interacted with it, so
there is no fact relative to W (yet). This allows us to
say that with respect to W the ‘state of the system F
has collapsed into the state |Fai〉 state with probability
P (Fai) = |ci|2’, even though W has not interacted F .
These observations show that decoherence does not im-
ply that there is a perfectly classical world of absolute
facts, but it does explain why (and when) we can reason
in terms of stable, hence classical, facts. The ubiquity of
decoherence makes very many facts largely stable with
respect to us.
C. Measurements
If two systems S and F interact and their respective
variables LS and LF get entangled, and if LF is stable
with respect toW, it follows immediately from the defini-
tions that the stability of LF with respect to W extends
to LS as well.
This is precisely what happens in a typical quantum
measurement of a variable LS in a laboratory. Think-
ing of S, F and W as, respectively, the system being
measured, the apparatus and the experimenter, we can
separate the measurement in three stages:
1. An interaction between the system and the appa-
ratus entangles LS with a pointer variable LF of
the apparatus.
2. LF gets correlated with a large number of micro-
scopic variables (forming E) that are inaccessible to
the observer W.
3. The observerW interacts with the pointer variable
LF to learn about LS .
Let’s trace this same story in terms of relative facts:
1. A relative fact is established between S and F .
2. A relative fact is established between F and E .
Since W does not interact with E , this stabilises
the previous fact for W.
3. The value of LF becomes a fact forW and, since it
is correlated with LS , the value of the variable LS
also becomes a fact with respect to W.
Already at stage 2, the observer might say that LS ‘has
been measured’ and apply (3), since the interaction with
the inaccessible degrees of freedom greatly suppresses in-
terference terms. In other words: stability allows W to
‘de-label’ facts when they are facts relative to F .
In the mathematical formalism, W can assume that
‘the wave function has collapsed’. The value of LS , still,
does not become a fact relative to the observer—and can-
not be known by the observer—until she actually inter-
acts with a variable correlated with it.
It is the way that W, F and E couple to each other
that make F a measuring apparatus forW. The stability
of F with respect toW extends to all other variables that
interact with S, hence W applying quantum mechanics,
might say that F causes S to collapse. However another
systemW ′ that couples differently to these systems might
still be able to detect interference effects.
In summary, we can distinguish two notions of facts
that play a role in quantum theory: relative facts and
stable facts.
Quantum theory allows us to talk about relative facts
and compute probabilities for them. Equation (2) holds
but (3) does not. The violation of (3) is quantum inter-
ference.
Stable facts are a subset of the relative facts. They sat-
isfy (3). A relative fact about a system F is stable with
respect to a system W if W has no access to a system
E which is sufficiently entangled with F . But stability
is only approximate (in principle, no fact is exactly sta-
ble for any finite ) and relative (depends on how the
‘observer’ system couples to the system and the environ-
ment).
II. FACTS AND REALITY
Up to now, we have given definitions of relative and
stable facts, and studied their properties. In this section
we discuss the roles of relative and stable facts for the
interpretation of quantum theory, namely for the relation
between the formalism and the reality it describes.
A. The link between the theory the world
Let us compare advantages and difficulties of interpret-
ing either stable or relative facts as the link between the-
ory and reality.
Stable facts are taken as the link between the formal-
ism and the world in textbook interpretations of quan-
tum theory. They are the conventional ‘measurement
outcomes’ in a macroscopic laboratory. They are similar
to the facts of classical mechanics because in the world
described by classical mechanics all facts (variables hav-
ing certain values at certain times) are exactly stable: the
(epistemic) probabilities for them to happen are always
exactly consistent with (1). In quantum mechanics, facts
4stable with respect to us are ubiquitous because of the
ubiquity of decoherence.
There are however two difficulties in taking stable facts
as the basis of the quantum ontology. First, stability
is relational. Facts are stable only relative to a system
that does not have sufficiently precise interactions with
an environment system. Therefore one does not avoid
relationalism by restricting to stable facts. Second, more
seriously, stability is generically approximate only. The
system and environment are still in a superposition with
respect to a third system.
These are serious difficulties if we want to take stable
facts as the only primary elements of reality. How stable
does a fact need to be before it is real? And with re-
spect to which systems does it have to be stable, in order
to be real? Any answer to these questions is bound to
be as unsatisfactory as the textbook interpretation that
requires a classical world.
The alternative is to embrace the contextuality of the
theory in full, and base its ontology on all relative facts.
Relative facts form the basis of a realist interpretation
in Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). The funda-
mental contextuality that characterises quantum theory
is interpreted in RQM as the discovery that facts about
a system are always defined relative to another system,
with which the first system interacts.
In the early history of quantum theory it was recog-
nised that every measurement involves an interaction,
and it was said that variables take values only upon mea-
surement. RQM notices that every interaction is in a
sense a measurement, in that it results in the value of a
variable to become a fact. These facts are not absolute,
they belong to a context; and there is no ‘special context’:
any system can be a context for any other system.
The quantum state (‘the wave function’) does not have
an ontic interpretation in RQM. The state is not a ‘thing’,
nor a condition of a system. Rather, it is what a physicist
uses to calculate probabilities for relative facts between
physical systems to happen, given the relevant informa-
tion she has. Unlike other epistemic interpretations of
quantum theory [13–18], the ontology of RQM is realist
in the sense that it is not about agents, beliefs, observers,
or experiences: it is about real facts of the world and rel-
ative probabilities of their occurrence. The ontology is
relational, in the sense that it is based on facts labelled
by physical contexts.
Relative facts, therefore, provide a relational but real-
ist interpretation to quantum theory which does not need
to refer to complex agents.
B. No-go theorems for non-relative facts
A number of results have recently appeared in the liter-
ature as no-go theorems for non-relative (absolute) facts
[19–21].
In [19], Frauchiger and Renner show that quantum the-
ory is inconsistent under a certain number of assump-
tions. A key assumption used to derive the contradiction
is the absolute nature of facts. This is Assumption (C)
in the paper, which can be stated as follows: “If W,
applying quantum theory, concludes that F knows that
LS = a, then W can conclude that LS = a.” The au-
thors argue that this assumption is required to deem the
theory consistent because different agents using the same
theory must arrive at the same conclusions. Let’s anal-
yse Assumption (C) in terms of relative facts: in this
language, it reads: “If W, applying quantum theory, can
be certain that LS = a relative to F , then W can reason
as if LS = a was also relative to W”. Now, as we have
shown, this holds only if every fact relative to F is stable
with respect to W, which is not a given and depends on
the physics. Therefore Assumption (C) only holds if S
or F decohere with respect to W. This is not the case in
the protocol, since W is supposed to have full quantum
control on F and S. As pointed out in [22], no contradic-
tion can be derived if one additionally assumes that what
is decoherent for F is also decoherent for W. Hence the
contradiction follows from inappropriately mixing con-
texts: forgetting that facts are relative and therefore (3)
does not hold in general.
Another enlightening result is proven by Brukner in
[20], and by Bong et. al. in [21]. These works show
that the conjunction of (a) observer independent facts
(b) locality and (c) no superdeterminism, leads to certain
inequalities on the correlations in certain scenarios. Like
Bell’s inequalities [23, 24], these are derived in a theory-
independent way, and then shown to be violated by the
predictions of quantum theory. If we do not reject (b)
or (c), the universal validity of quantum theory implies
that facts cannot all be observer independent3 [28].
Remarkably, these inequalities have already been
shown experimentally to be violated for the case in which
Wigner’s friend is a single photon [21]. One might be
tempted to dismiss the result on the ground that pho-
tons do not generate facts, but this opens the problem
of deciding which systems give rise to facts. If quantum
theory is universally valid, advances in quantum tech-
nologies will allow to perform the same experiment with
increasingly complex ‘friends’. The predictions of quan-
tum theory remain the same: the statistics are incompat-
ible with the assumptions of observer independent facts.
Once again, therefore, the result confirms that the facts
quantum theory deals with are facts relative to systems.
We only find language ‘observer-independent’ a bit
misleading: ‘observers’ in the sense of complex systems
play no role in all this: facts happen in interactions with
3 While the word ‘locality’ means different things in different quan-
tum physics communities, most epistemic interpretations accept
the notion used to prove the result of Bong et.al.. See [25] for an
in depth analysis on the notions of locality and superdetermin-
ism in the context of the implications of Bell’s theorems.
For a discussion of the implications of the ontology of RQM to
Bell’s inequalities, see [26] and [27].
5any system. There are facts relative to any physical sys-
tem, not just to special ‘observing’ systems.
C. Conclusions and final comments
The insight of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM)
is that recognising the relative nature of facts offers a
straightforward solution to the measurement problem.
The measurement problem is the apparent incompati-
bility between two postulates: the ‘projection’ and the
‘linear evolution’ postulate. Both postulates can be cor-
rect: they refer to facts relative to different systems. Say
that S interacts with F , so that a fact relative to F is
established. Then the projection postulate is used to up-
date the state of S with respect to F , while the unitary
evolution postulate is used to update the state of S − F
with respect to a third system W.
In a slogan: ‘Wigner’s facts are not necessarily his
Friend’s facts’.
This by no means implies that when Wigner and his
friend compare notes they find contradictions [4]. Inter-
actions between S and F do have influence on the facts
relative to W. Indeed, after an interaction, S and F are
entangled relative toW, meaning that in interacting with
the two systems, W will find the two correlated. There-
fore Wigner will always agree with his Friend about the
value of LS once he too interacts with them. In this
sense, relative facts correspond to real events, they have
universal empirical consequences.
Still, accepting the relativity of all facts is a strong con-
ceptual step. It amounts giving up the absolute nature of
facts, namely the existence of an absolute ‘macroreality’
and of ‘observer-independent facts’ in the language used
in discussions of Bell’s inequalities [25]. Such a macro-
reality only emerges approximately, relative to systems
for which decoherence is sufficiently strong.
Decoherence has always played a peculiar role in the
discussions on the measurement problem. On the one
hand, it is simply a true physical phenomenon, obviously
relevant for shedding light on quantum measurement. On
the other hand, there is consensus that decoherence alone
is not a solution of the measurement problem, because it
does not suffice to provide a link between theory and
reality. Decoherence needs an ontology. Relative facts
provide such a general ontology, which is well defined
with or without decoherence. Decoherence clarifies why
a large class of relative facts become stable with respect
to us and form the stable classical world in which we live.
The violation of (1) when used for facts relative to dif-
ferent systems sheds also some light on the underpinnings
of quantum logic. The violation of (1), indeed, has been
interpreted as a violation of classical logic [29], as it can
be written as
P (b and (a1 or a2)) 6= P ((b and a1) or (b and a2)), (9)
in contradiction with the classical logic theorem
b and (a1 or a2) = (b and a1) or (b and a2). (10)
The apparent violation of logic is understood in RQM as
a result of forgetting that facts are relative: labelled by a
context, as Bohr has repeatedly pointed out. Facts rela-
tive to a context cannot be used, in general, to compute
probabilities of facts related to other contexts because
what is a fact in a certain context is not necessarily a
fact in other contexts.
As a final remark, observe that if the quantum state
has no ontic interpretation, the only meaning of ‘being in
a quantum superposition’ is that interference effects are
to be expected. To say ‘Friend is in a quantum super-
position’ does not mean anything more than saying that
Wigner would be mistaken in using (3). It has no impli-
cations on how Friend would ‘feel’ in being in a superpo-
sition. Friend sees a definite result of his measurement, a
fact, and this does not prevent Wigner from having the
chance to see an interference effect in his facts. Wigner’s
friend does not stop being an observer simply because
Wigner has a chance to detect interference effects in his
facts. Schro¨dinger’s cat has no reason to feel ‘superim-
posed’.
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